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Paradoxes and Mechanisms for Choice under Risk
By James C. Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj, and Ulrich Schmidt1

Abstract: Experiments on choice under risk typically involve multiple decisions by
individual subjects. The choice of mechanism for selecting decision(s) for payoff is an
essential design feature unless subjects isolate each one of the multiple decisions. We report
treatments with different payoff mechanisms but the same decision tasks. The data show large
differences across mechanisms in subjects’ revealed risk preferences, a clear violation of
isolation. We illustrate the importance of these mechanism effects by identifying their
implications for classical tests of theories of decision under risk. We discuss theoretical
properties of commonly used mechanisms, and new mechanisms introduced herein, in order
to clarify which mechanisms are theoretically incentive compatible for which theories. We
identify behavioral properties of some mechanisms that can introduce bias in elicited risk
preferences – from cross-task contamination – even when the mechanism used is theoretically
incentive compatible. We explain that selection of a payoff mechanism is an important
component of experimental design in many topic areas including social preferences, public
goods, bargaining, and choice under uncertainty and ambiguity as well as experiments on
decisions under risk.
Keywords: payoff mechanisms, incentive compatibility, experiments,
cross-task contamination, paradoxes
JEL classifications: C90, D80
1 Introduction
Most experiments on choice under risk involve multiple decisions by individual subjects. This
necessitates choice of a mechanism for determining incentive payments to the subjects.
Mechanisms used in papers published by top five general readership journals and a prominent
field journal vary quite widely from “paying all decisions sequentially” to “paying all
decisions at the end” to “randomly paying one decision for each subject” to “randomly paying
a few decisions for each subject” to “randomly paying some of the subjects” to “randomly
paying one of the subjects” to “rank-based payment” to “no payment” to unidentified
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mechanisms.2 This raises questions about whether different payoff mechanisms elicit different
data in otherwise identical experimental treatments and, if so, whether these mechanism
effects have significant implications for conclusions drawn from data. We report an
experiment with several payoff mechanisms that directly addresses these questions. Data from
our experiment show that subjects’ revealed risk preferences differ across mechanisms. We
illustrate the importance of these payoff mechanism effects by using data from alternative
mechanisms to test for consistency with classic paradoxes designed to challenge theories of
decision under risk.
We provide an explanation of theoretical incentive compatibility or incompatibility of
alternative mechanisms for prominent decision theories. Data from our experiments are used
to identify mechanism biases in risk preference elicitation such as choice-order effects and
other types of cross-task contamination in which a subject’s choice in one decision task may
be affected by the choices made in some other tasks.
Issues of mechanism incentive incompatibility and cross-task contamination are not
confined to experiments on risk aversion. We explain that the payoff mechanism effects have
implications for experiments in many other topic areas including social preferences, public
goods, bargaining, and choice under uncertainty and ambiguity.

2 Classic properties of theories of decision under risk
Allais (1953) raised an objection to the independence axiom of expected utility theory (EU)
by constructing thought experiments that seem to imply paradoxical outcomes. Subsequent
behavioral experiments focused on two patterns that are incompatible with the independence
axiom: the common ratio effect (CRE) and common consequence effect (CCE). As we shall
explain, some of the lottery pairs used in our experiment were selected because they make it
possible to observe CRE and CCE if they characterize experimental subjects’ revealed risk
preferences.
Yaari (1987) introduced the dual independence axiom and constructed an alternative
theory to EU with functional that is nonlinear in probabilities (unless the agent is risk neutral)
and linear in payoffs (for all risk attitudes). The dual common ratio effect (DCRE) and dual
common consequence effect (DCCE) are the dual analogs of CRE and CCE. Some of the
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lottery pairs used in our experiment were designed to make it possible to observe DCRE and
DCCE if they characterize experimental subjects’ revealed risk preferences.
The five pairs of lotteries used in our experiment are portrayed in Table 1. The leftmost column lists the lottery pair numbers and the top row shows bingo ball numbers that
determine lottery payoffs. The dollar amounts of payoffs are reported in the table.
Probabilities of those payoffs are represented in two ways, by the widths of the rectangles
containing the dollar amounts and by the ratios of the number of bingo balls that generate
those payoffs to the total number of 20 bingo balls. For example, the less risky (S) lottery in
Pair 4 pays $6 with probability 1/4 (5 balls/20 balls) or $12 with probability 3/4 (15 balls/20
balls). The more risky lottery (R) in Pair 4 pays $0 with probability 1/20 (1 ball/20 balls) or
$10 with probability 1/5 (4 balls/20 balls) or $12 with probability 3/4 (15 balls/20 balls).
Table 1. Lottery Pairs Used in the Experiment
Less Risky (S)
Pair\Ball Nr.

1-5

6-15

1

$0

2
3
4

$0

More Risky (R)
16-20

1

$3

$12
$18

6-16

$0

17-20
$5

$10

$6

$6

5
$0

$6

5

2-4

$0
0

$10
$12

$10
$12
$22

A test for CRE uses two lottery pairs where the lotteries in one pair (Pair 3 in Table 1)
are constructed from the lotteries in the other pair (Pair 2 in Table 1) by multiplying all
probabilities by a common factor (1/4 in our study) and assigning the remaining probability to
a common outcome ($0 in our study). It follows from linearity in probabilities of the expected
utility functional that an expected utility agent would choose either the less risky lotteries in
both pairs or the riskier ones.3 Any mixed choices of the riskier and the less risky lottery
across Pairs 2 and 3 reveals CRE.
A test for CCE also uses two lottery pairs. Here, the lotteries in one pair (Pair 4 in
Table 1) are constructed from the lotteries in another pair (Pair 3 in Table 1) by shifting
probability mass (75% in our study) from one common outcome ($0 in our study) to a
different common outcome ($12 in our study). It is easy to verify that expected utility theory
requires that either the less risky lotteries be chosen in both pairs or the riskier ones be chosen
in both pairs. Any mixture of the riskier and the less risky lotteries across Pairs 3 and 4
reveals CCE.
3

Within any pair of lotteries, we call the less risky (resp. riskier) lottery the one with the smaller (resp. larger)
variance.
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The null hypotheses that follow from the independence axiom of expected utility
theory are that the proportion of choices of the less risky option in Pair 3 should be the same
as the proportions of choices of the less risky options in Pairs 2 and 4:
Hypothesis 1: The proportions of choices of the less risky option are the same for Pair
2 and Pair 3 (absence of CRE).
Hypothesis 2: The proportions of choices of the less risky option are the same for Pair
3 and Pair 4 (absence of CCE).
One-sided alternatives to the above hypotheses are provided by fanning-out (Machina 1982)
and fanning-in (Neilson, 1992). Subjects’ revealed risk preferences under each mechanism
can be used to test these hypotheses.
DCRE and DCCE play the same role for dual theory of expected utility (Yaari 1987)
as CRE and CCE do for expected utility theory. Because the dual theory functional is linear in
payoffs, it exhibits constant absolute and constant relative risk aversion. Consequently, neither
multiplying all outcomes in a lottery pair by the same factor (DCRE: see Pairs 1 and 3 in
Table 1, the multiplier is 2) nor adding a constant to all outcomes in a lottery pair (DCCE: see
Pairs 2 and 5 where the constant equals $12) affects choices. Yaari (1987) stated that the dual
paradoxes could be used to refute his theory analogously to the way in which CRE and CCE
had been used to refute expected utility theory. As far as we know, however, the dual
paradoxes have never been investigated in a systematic empirical test with a theoretically
incentive compatible mechanism.
The null hypotheses that follow from the dual independence axiom (which implies
linearity in payoffs) are that the proportion of choices of the less risky option should be: (a)
the same in Pairs 1 and 3; and (b) the same in Pairs 2 and 5. The null hypothesis of choices in
Pairs 1 and 3 coming from the same distribution also follows from a power function for utility
of payoffs with or without linearity in probabilities. On the other hand, the null hypothesis of
choices in Pairs 2 and 5 coming from the same underlying distribution is also consistent with
an exponential function for utility of payoffs. Data can be used to conduct tests of the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: The proportions of choices of the less risky option are the same for Pair
1 and Pair 3 (absence of DCRE).
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Hypothesis 4: The proportions of choices of the less risky option are the same for Pair
2 and Pair 5 (absence of DCCE).
One-sided alternatives to Hypothesis 3 are given by decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA)
or increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA). One-sided alternatives to Hypothesis 4 are
provided by decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) or increasing absolute risk aversion
(IARA).
3 Theoretical properties of incentive mechanisms
We consider several payoff mechanisms commonly used for multiple decision experiments
and new mechanisms introduced herein. We also consider another “mechanism” in which
each subject makes only one decision.
The payoff mechanism that appears to be most commonly used in experiments on
individual choice in strategic settings (e.g., markets, public goods) is the one in which each
decision is paid sequentially before a subsequent decision is made; we label this mechanism
“pay all sequentially” (PAS). Another way in which all decisions are paid is to pay them all
at the end of the experiment with independent draws of random variables; we label this
mechanism “pay all independently” (PAI). A mechanism commonly used in experiments on
decision under risk is to randomly select one decision for payoff at the end of the experiment.
There are two ways in which this payoff mechanism is commonly used which differ in
whether a subject is shown all lotteries before making any choices. In one version of the
mechanism (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002, Starmer and Sugden 1991) a subject is shown all
lotteries in advance before any choices are made; we label this version of the mechanism “pay
one randomly with prior information” (PORpi). In an alternative version of this mechanism
(e.g., Hey and Orme 1994, Hey and Lee 2005a, 2005b) a subject is shown each lottery pair for
the first time just before a choice is made; we call this version of the mechanism “pay one
randomly with no prior information” (PORnp). We also study properties of a hybrid
mechanism that is a composition of POR and PAS. With this mechanism, chosen options are
played out sequentially (as in PAS) before the one choice relevant for payoff is randomly
selected (as in POR).4 We name this mechanism PORpas.
To our best knowledge, a new mechanism is to pay all decisions at the end of the
experiment with one realization of the state of the world that determines all payoffs; the
theoretical properties of this mechanism (for comonotonic lotteries) are explained below.

4

Experimenting with this hybrid mechanism was suggested by a referee. Baltussen et al. (2012) use a similar
hybrid mechanism, in an experiment with the game Deal or No Deal, which includes many features not usually
found in pair-wise choice experiments that could systematically affect behavior.
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There are two versions of this mechanism that differ in scale of payoffs. In one version, full
payoff for all chosen lotteries is made according to one random draw at the end of the
experiment; we label this mechanism “pay all correlated” (PAC). With N decisions, the scale
of the payoffs with PAC, which is the same as with PAS and PAI, is N times the expected
payoff with any version of POR. The alternative version, called PAC/N, pays 1/N of the
payoffs for all chosen lotteries; this version of the mechanism has the same scale of payoffs as
(all versions of) POR.
In a review of the experimental evidence on violations of expected utility, Cubitt, et al.
(2001) advocate use of between-subjects designs, in which each subject makes one choice,
rather than within-subjects designs with multiple decisions. We implement this approach and
compare the resulting data to data elicited by multiple decision protocols using the above
payoff mechanisms. We subsequently refer to the single decision per subject protocol as the
“one task” (OT) mechanism.

3.1 Incentive compatibility
A payoff mechanism is incentive compatible if it provides incentives for truthful revelation of
preferences. We consider two definitions, “strong incentive compatibility” and “weak
incentive compatibility”, which differ in generality of the assumption one makes about
interaction between payoffs within and outside an experiment.
In the context of an experiment on pairwise choice, by strong incentive compatibility
we mean the following. Suppose that the researcher is interested in eliciting an individual’s
preference over some Option a and Option b in an experiment. The individual’s preference for
Option a or Option b within the experiment may depend on the prizes and probability
distribution F of states of the world external to the experiment. Let this preference ordering be
denoted by

F

and assume that F is independent of what happens in the experiment (because

the experimenter has control internal to the lab but no control external to the lab). The purpose
of an experiment is to learn whether a

F

b or b

F

a by observing incentivized choice(s)

between Option a and Option b. Incentivizing choices involves use of a payoff mechanism
that may create incentives for “untruthful” revelation of the preference
Option b. Let

M
F

F

over Option a and

denote the individual’s preferences when choices are implemented with

mechanism M. Now consider the choice between Option a and Option b in the context of
additional choices (in the experiment) between some Option Ai and Option Bi, for i = 1, 2,…,
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n. We say that payoff mechanism M is strongly incentive compatible when a
if a

F

M
F

b if and only

b for all possible specifications of the n alternative pairs of options.
We also use a definition of weak incentive compatibility. Again suppose the researcher

is interested in eliciting an individual’s preference for Option a or Option b. The individual’s
preference for Option a or Option b within the experiment may depend on the amount of his
(fixed, certain) wealth wo outside the experiment. Let this preference ordering be denoted by
a

wo

M

b Let

wo

denote the individual’s preferences when choices are implemented with

mechanism M. We say that payoff mechanism M is weakly incentive compatible when
a

M
wo

b if and only if a

wo

b for all possible specifications of the n alternative pairs of

options given a fixed wealth wo outside the experiment. Clearly, if a payoff mechanism is
strongly incentive compatible then it is also weakly incentive compatible. Furthermore, if a
payoff mechanism is not weakly incentive compatible then it is also not strongly incentive
compatible.
In this paper lotteries will often be denoted by ( X1 , p1;
outcome Xs is obtained with probability ps, for s  1,

; X m , pm ) , indicating that

, m. Outcome Xs can be a monetary

amount or a lottery. In an experiment that includes n choice tasks in which the subject has to
choose between Options Ai and Bi, for i  1,

, n, the choice of the subject in task i will be

denoted by Ci.
3.2 The pay one randomly (PORnp, PORpi and PORpas) mechanisms
With either the PORnp or PORpi mechanism each decision usually has a 1/ n chance of being
played out for real. Consider a subject who conforms to the reduction of compound lotteries
axiom and has made all her choices except the choice in task i. As discussed by Holt (1986),
her choice between Ai and Bi determines whether she will receive compound lottery
(Ai,1/n;C,1-1/n) or (Bi,1/n;C,1-1/n), where C = (C1, 1/(n-1); …; Ci-1, 1/(n-1); Ci+1, 1/(n-1); …;
Cn, 1/(n-1)) is the lottery for which the subject receives all her previous choices with equal
probability 1/(n-1). Consequently, a subject whose preferences satisfy the reduction and
independence axioms has an incentive to reveal her preferences truthfully because under those
axioms: Ai

F

Bi if and only if (Ai,1/n;C,1-1/n)

M
F

(Bi,1/n;C,1-1/n) when the mechanism, M

is PORnp or PORpi. Hence both PORnp and PORpi are strongly incentive compatible for
theories that assume the reduction and independence axioms. PORpas is also strongly
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incentive compatible for all theories that include these axioms as the only difference is that
the previous choices, Ci are now replaced by the realizations of outcomes from the previous
choices in the above demonstration.
The above result does not imply that any version of POR is theoretically appropriate
for testing other theories that assume reduction but do not include the independence axiom. A
simple example – referred to as Example 1 in the subsequent discussion – can be used to
construct a counterexample to (weak and, hence, strong as well) incentive compatibility of
PORnp or PORpi or PORpas for rank dependent utility theory (RDU) by assuming the utility
(given wo ) of experimental prize in the amount x is uwo ( x)  x and the transformation of
decumulative probabilities (given wo ) is the 0.9 power function. Let Vwo ( L)   G 0.9 ( x)d x
be an individual’s valuation of a lottery L in the experiment that pays a monetary payoff
larger than x with probability G ; the valuation represents an individual’s preferences

wo

.

Consider two choice options: Option A, with a sure payoff of $30, and Option B with an
even-odds (50/50) payoff of $100 or 0. It can be easily verified that the agent with the
assumed Vw () prefers Option A to Option B. Now assume the agent gets to make the choice
o

between Option A and Option B two times and that one of the choices is randomly selected
for payoff by a coin flip. Under PORnp or PORpi or PORpas and the reduction of compound
lotteries axiom, straightforward calculations reveal that choosing Option A in the first task
and Option B in the second task is preferred to choosing Option A twice because the resulting
(reduced simple) lottery {$100, 1/4; $30, 1/2; $0, 1/4} in the experiment has a higher rank
dependent utility, Vw () than $30 for sure. It is true that in PORnp (unlike in PORpi) an RDU
o

agent would not know in advance that he will be asked to choose twice between A and B but
the distortion of choices is still present. The first time the subject is asked to choose between
A and B he prefers to choose A (which is truthful revelation). Having chosen A in the first
task, choosing B in the second task is preferred to again choosing A for the same reason as
stated above. Therefore all three versions of POR are not incentive compatible for RDU. The
same counterexample can be used to show that none of the three versions of POR is
incentive compatible for cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
Similarly, it can be easily verified that a dual expected utility agent (Yaari 1987) whose
preferences

wo

can be represented by Vwo ( L)   G 0.9 ( x)dx prefers a sure amount $30 over a

binary lottery that pays $55 or 0 with 0.5 probability but with any of the three versions of
POR choosing the sure amount ($30) in the first task and the binary lottery ($55 or $0 with
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even odds) in the second task is preferred to choosing the sure amount in both tasks.
Therefore, the POR mechanisms are not incentive compatible for the dual theory.
3.3 The pay all correlated (PAC and PAC/N) mechanisms
As shown above, the reduction and independence axioms imply that PORpi and PORnp and
PORpas are strongly incentive compatible. We here show that the reduction and dual
independence axioms imply that PAC and PAC/N are weakly incentive compatible for
comonotonic lotteries.
For the PAC and PAC/N mechanisms, events need to be defined (e.g., bingo balls
numbered from 1 to 20 in our experiment) and all lotteries need to be arranged in the same
order of prizes such that they are comonotonic. More formally, let there be given m events
indexed by s  1, , m and let lotteries be identified by Ai = (ai1, p1; …; aim, pm) and Bi = (bi1,
p1; …; bim, pm) where ais (resp. bis) is the monetary outcome of lottery Ai (resp. Bi) in state s
and ps is the probability of that state. We arrange lotteries to be comonotonic: ais  ais+1 and
bis  bis+1 for all s  1,

, m  1 and all i  1,

, n . At the end of the experiment the state of

nature is resolved and, for the realized event, prizes of all chosen lotteries are paid out under
PAC. Under PAC/N, the payout is 1/n of the sum of all chosen lotteries’ payouts for the
realized event.
As above, let an agent’s choice between Ai and Bi in task i be denoted by Ci. The
payoff from Ci if state of the world s occurs is denoted by cis. Suppose, as above, that a
subject has made all choices apart from the choice in task i. Then her choice between Ai and
Bi will determine whether she will receive either Ai*= (ai1 + j≠icj1, p1; …; aim + j≠icjm, pm) or
Bi* = (bi1 + j≠icj1, p1; …; bim + j≠icjm, pm) as reward before the state of nature is determined.
A subject whose preferences satisfy the dual independence axiom has an incentive to reveal
her preferences truthfully because, under that axiom, Ai

wo

Bi if and only if Ai*

M
wo

Bi* when

the mechanism, M is PAC. Thus PAC is weakly incentive compatible under Yaari’s (1987)
dual theory. Moreover, if lotteries are cosigned (i.e., the outcomes in a given state are all gains
or all losses) PAC is also weakly incentive compatible under linear cumulative prospect
theory (Schmidt and Zank 2009) since in this case the independence condition of that model
has the same implications as the dual independence axiom.
Although PAC is weakly incentive compatible for the dual theory, it is not strongly
incentive compatible as the following counterexample shows. Consider Option A (certainty of
$30) and Option C (even-odds bet of $55 or 0) and let the valuation of a lottery L be
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VF ( L)   G 0.85 ( x)dx , i.e., the functional that represents

F

is linear in payoffs. Assume there

is background risk, F external to the experiment in which there is equal probability that wealth
w will be $40 or 0. In this case, dual theory implies A

F

B but with PAC choosing B twice is

preferred to choosing A in both tasks.
When we wish to compare PAC with (any version of) POR we have to keep in mind
that the expected total payoff from the experiment is N times higher under PAC. This may
have significant effects on behavior. Therefore, we also include PAC/N in our experimental
study where the payoff of PAC is divided by the number of tasks. PAC/N has the same
theoretical properties as PAC; it is weakly incentive compatible under the dual theory and
linear cumulative prospect theory.
Option A (certainty of $30) and Option B (even odds bet of $100 or 0) from Example
1 can also be used to illustrate that PAC and PAC/N are not incentive compatible for EU or
RDU. An EU agent with the square root utility function (and no transformation of
probabilities) prefers Option A to Option B but with PAC or PAC/N the agent prefers to
choose AB (i.e., $130 or $30 with even odds) over AA ($60 for sure). Similarly, an RDU
agent with the utility and probability transformation functions as in Example 1 prefers Option
A to Option B but with PAC or PAC/N would make the same two choices as an EU agent.
3.4 The pay all sequentially (PAS) mechanism
With PAS, each chosen option is paid before a subsequent decision is made. It is easy to see
that PAS is not theoretically incentive compatible for the expected utility of terminal wealth
(EUTW) model. For illustration reasons, we here assume that, given the outside-experiment
wealth wo , the subject values experimental prizes, x according to the square root function,

uwo ( x)  x . We use Option A ($30 for sure) and Option B ($100 or $0 with even odds) of
Example 1 to show possible within-experiment wealth effects with PAS for the EUTW
model. Such an agent ranks Option A higher than Option B in one choice task. If the agent
would choose between these two options under PAS two times, however, the lottery {$200,
1/4; $100, 1/4, $30, 1/2}, that is choosing Option B in the first choice and Option B (resp.
Option A) in the second choice if the outcome of the first choice is $100 (resp. $0), is
preferred to choosing Option A twice (i.e., $60 for sure). Therefore, PAS is not incentive
compatible for the EUTW model. The possible wealth effect of PAS is not relevant to the
expected utility of income model or the expected utility of terminal wealth model with
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) or reference dependent preferences for which the
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reference point adjusts immediately after paying out the first choice, as in cumulative prospect
theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).

PAS is strongly incentive compatible for these

models. Similarly, PAS is also strongly incentive compatible for the dual theory of expected
utility (Yaari 1987).
3.5 The pay all independently (PAI) mechanism
In the PAI mechanism, at the end of the experiment all tasks are played out independently.
Theoretically, PAI has a problem, well known as portfolio effect in the finance literature: the
risk of a mixture of two independent random variables is less than the risk of each variable in
isolation. Due to this risk reduction effect, PAI is incentive compatible only in the case of risk
neutrality. A counterexample to incentive compatibility of PAI for expected utility theory can
be constructed by again using the (square root) utility function and two choice options of
Example 1. The agent prefers Option A (certainty of $30) to Option B (even odds bet of $100
or $0). When presenting the choice between A and B twice under PAI, however, choice BB
that results in lottery ($200, 1/4; $100, 1/2; $0, 1/4) in the experiment has a higher expected
utility than choice AA ($60 for sure). A straightforward extension shows that Example 1
provides a counterexample to incentive compatibility of PAI for rank dependent utility theory
and cumulative prospect theory.
3.6 The one task (OT) mechanism
So far we can conclude that some payment mechanisms for binary choice are theoretically
incentive compatible only if utility is linear in probabilities or in payoffs or if the model is
defined on income rather than terminal wealth. This is not true for the OT mechanism. With
this mechanism, each subject has to respond to only one choice task which is played out for
real. Since there exists only one decision task, a subject has an incentive to reveal her
preferences

F

truthfully for the more preferred option available in that task. Besides being

rather costly, this mechanism has one obvious disadvantage: OT allows only for tests of
hypotheses using between-subjects data. OT is nevertheless very interesting because it is the
only mechanism that is always (i.e., for all possible preferences) incentive compatible.
3.7 Summary of incentive compatibility conditions
Table 2 gives an overview of the discussion in the present section. PORpi and PORnp and
PORpas are strongly incentive compatible if the independence axiom holds. PAC and PAC/N
are weakly incentive compatible if the dual independence axiom holds. PAS is strongly
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incentive compatible for the dual independence axiom and for models defined on income
rather than terminal wealth. OT is strongly incentive compatible for all theories. And, of
course, all mechanisms discussed above are strongly incentive compatible for expected value
theory with functional that is always linear in both payoffs and probabilities.
Table 2. Incentive Compatibility of Payoff Mechanisms
Preference Condition

Mechanisms

Strong Incentive Compatibility
All theories

OT

Independencea

PORpi, PORnp, PORpas

Dual independencea
Income modelsa

PAS
PAS

Expected valuea

All mechanisms

Weak Incentive Compatibility
Dual independencea
a

PAC, PAC/N

Given the reduction axiom.

4 Experimental protocol
The experiment includes the five pairs of lotteries reported in Table 1. Payoff in any lottery is
determined by drawing a ball in the presence of the subjects from a bingo cage containing 20
balls numbered 1, 2, …, 20. Lotteries were not shown to participants in the format of Table 1.
They were presented in a format illustrated by the example in Figure 1 which shows one of
the two ways in which the lotteries of Pair 4 were presented to subjects in the experiment.

Ball nr

1

Option A
Option B $0

2

3

4

$6

5

6

7

8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
$12

$10

$12

Figure 1. An Example of Presentation of Lotteries
Some subjects would see the Pair 4 lotteries as shown in Figure 1 while others would see
them (randomly) presented with inverted top and bottom positioning and reversed A and B
labeling. (See below for full details on randomized presentation of option pairs.)
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The experiment was conducted in the laboratory of the Experimental Economics
Center at Georgia State University. Subject instructions are contained in an appendix
available on the journal’s web site. Subjects in groups OTi, i = 1, 2, …, 5, had to perform
simply one choice between the lotteries of Pair i which was played out for real. Subjects in an
OTi treatment were first shown lottery Pair i at the time they made their decision. In treatment
PORnp subjects were first shown a lottery pair at the time they made their decision for that
pair. In all other multiple decision treatments, including PORpi and PORpas, subjects were
shown all five lottery pairs at the beginning of a session, as follows. Each subject was given
an envelope with five (independently) randomly-ordered small sheets of paper. Each of the
five small sheets of paper presented one lottery pair in the format illustrated by Figure 1. Each
subject could display his or her five sheets of paper in any way desired on the table in his or
her private decision carrel.
Subjects entered their decisions in computers in their private decision carrels. In all
treatments, including OT, the top or bottom positioning of the two lotteries in any pair and
their labeling as Option A or Option B were (independently) randomly selected by the
decision software for each individual subject. In all treatments other than OT, the five lottery
pairs were presented to individual subjects by the decision software in independently-drawn
random orders. Each decision screen contained only a single pair of lotteries.
In treatments PAI, PAC, PAC/N, and PAS subjects had to make choices for all five
pairs but here the choice from every pair was played out for real by drawing a ball from a
bingo cage. In treatment PAI the five choices were played out independently at the end of the
experiment whereas in treatments PAC and PAC/N the five choices were played out
correlated at the end of the experiment (i.e., one ball was drawn from the bingo cage which
determined the realized state of the world, hence the payoff of all five choices). In treatment
PAS the chosen lotteries were played immediately after each choice was made (by drawing a
ball from a bingo cage after each decision), and the realized payoff was added to the subject’s
monetary earnings before the next choice was made.
Subjects in treatments PORpi and PORnp had to make choices for all five lottery pairs
and at the end one pair was randomly selected (by drawing a ball from a bingo cage) and the
chosen lottery in that pair was played out for real (by drawing a ball from another bingo cage).
In treatment PORpas subjects had to make choices for all five lottery pairs but the outcome
from each chosen option was realized (by drawing a ball from a bingo cage) before the next
choice option pair was presented to the subject. After all (choices had been made and)
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outcomes had been realized, one outcome was randomly selected for money payoff (by
drawing a ball from another bingo cage).
In all treatments subjects were permitted to inspect the bingo cage(s) and the balls
before making their decisions. Each ball drawn from a bingo cage was done in the presence of
the subjects and put back in the cage in the presence of the subjects.
5 Tests of classic properties with data from alternative mechanisms
Hypothesis 1 is tested with data from each mechanism as follows. A probit model is used to
estimate the probability of choosing the less risky lottery in Pairs 2 and 3; right-hand variables
include a dummy variable for Pair 3 and subject characteristic variables for Field (of) Study, 5
Birth Order, Female, Black, and Older than 21. The question of interest here is whether the
estimated effect of Pair 3 (i.e., the “extra” likelihood of choosing the less risky option in Pair
3) is significantly different from 0; if so, the sign of the estimate will be used to determine
whether our data are characterized by the fanning-in or fanning-out property. We report in the
CRE column of Table 3 whether the estimated effect of Pair 3 is significantly different from
zero with a two-sided test; complete results from the probit estimation for Hypothesis 1 are
reported in appendix Table A.1 (top part). We also report, in the text, one-sided test results
(and one-sided p-values) when there is a familiar one-sided alternative hypothesis.
Table 3. Test Results for Hypotheses 1 - 4
Mechanism

CRE

CCE

DCRE

DCCE

OT

No

No

No

Yese

PORnp

No

No

No

No

PORpi

No

Yesb

Yesc

No

PORpas

Yesa

No

No

No

PAS

No

Yesb

No

No

PAI

Yesa

No

No

No

PAC/N

No

Yesb

No

No

PAC

Yesa

No

Yesd

No

Notes: a. Fan Out; b. Fan In; c. IRRA; d. DRRA; e. IARA

First consider the test of Hypothesis 1 using data from the OT mechanism, reported in
the CRE column and first row of Table 3. We find that OT data do not reject Hypothesis 1,
5

Subjects were asked to report their majors. We have grouped their responses in Science and Engineering,
Business and Economics and Others; the last category will be the base group in our regressions.
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meaning that the hypothesis of absence of CRE is not rejected. The two-sided p-value on the
Pair 3 dummy variable in the OT column of Table A.1 is 0.127. This test result is reported as
a “No” in the OT row and CRE column of Table 3, which corresponds to the common
practice of reporting a theoretical paradox “has not been observed” in cases when the null
hypothesis of its absence is not rejected.
Data for PORpas, PAI and PAC do reject Hypothesis 1, meaning that the hypothesis of
absence of CRE is rejected. This test result is reported as a “Yes” in the relevant rows of
Table 3. Data for these three mechanisms reject Hypothesis 1 at 5% significance level in favor
of fanning out of indifference curves since the estimated effect of Pair 3 is negative (i.e., the
less risky option is chosen less often in Pair 3 than in Pair 2). The specific pattern (“Fan Out”)
of CRE observed in the data is reported in the footnote to the “Yes” entries in the CRE
column of Table 3; the one-sided p-values are 0.013 (PORpas), 0.035 (PAI) and 0.003 (PAC).
Estimated effects of Pair 3 with data from all other mechanisms are not significantly
different from 0 (two-sided p  0.10), so five out of eight of the multiple-choice-task
mechanisms do not reject Hypothesis 1 (absence of CRE). These findings are reported in the
CRE column of Table 3 as “No”, meaning CRE is not observed.
To be able to compare conclusions we draw from multiple-task treatments with those
for the OT treatment we used the same method of data analysis for all treatments. Since we
do not have within-subjects data for the OT treatment, we began by reporting estimates from
probit regressions that use between-subjects data. But for multiple-task treatments we also
have within-subjects data so we will be able to say more. Counting the number of subjects
who chose the riskier option R in one of the pairs (2 or 3) and the less risky (or safer) option S
in the other, we find the following figures (in percentages): 53%, 38% and 43% in PORnp,
PORpi and PORpas, higher figures of 50% and 45% in PAC/N and PAC, and lower figures of
36% in PAS and 32% in PAI. In testing for statistical significance we need to take into
account that some subjects may be indifferent between the two options within a pair. The null
hypothesis that follows from the indifference argument is that frequencies of safer and riskier
choices (or SR and RS patterns) are similar across Pairs 2 and 3. According to Cochran’s Q
test reported in the last row of the CRE part of Table A.1,6 the null hypothesis of no
systematic violations is rejected by PAC data (p = 0.008) and PORpas data (p = 0.029) and
weakly rejected by PAI data (p = 0.083). These within-subjects test results are consistent with
the between-subjects test results from the probit regression.

6

The Cochran test is the same as the McNemar test since we have only two groupings here.
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Estimates from probit regression using data for Pairs 3 and 4 of the likelihood of
choosing the less risky option within a pair are used in tests of Hypothesis 2 reported in the
CCE column of Table 3 (and complete results are in the CCE part of appendix Table A.1).
The estimated Pair 4 effect is significant for PORpi data (p = 0.058), PAS data (p = 0.002)
and PAC/N data (p = 0.076); all of these estimates are negative, which is consistent with
indifference curves that Fan In. Estimated Pair 4 effect with data from other mechanisms is
insignificantly different from 0, which is reported as “No” in the CCE column of Table 3. The
p-values for Cochran’s Q test results reported in the CCE part of Table A.1 are: PORpi data
(0.059), PAS data (0.007), and PAC/N data (0.096); p-values for other mechanisms are
greater than 0.1.
Data from the several mechanisms have different implications for testing expected
utility theory. Six of the eight mechanisms produce data that are inconsistent with expected
utility theory because the data either reject Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2 (the entries in Table
3 are “Yes” for presence of CRE or CEE). Furthermore, these mechanisms produce data that
are variously consistent with indifference curves that Fan In, Fan Out, or are parallel.
The test results are less heterogeneous if one looks only at the four mechanisms that
are theoretically incentive compatible for expected utility theory: OT, PORpi, PORnp and
PORpas. Data from three out of four mechanisms do not reject Hypothesis 1, and data for
three out of four do not reject Hypothesis 2, but the mechanism with the one rejection differs
for the two paradoxes.
Results from probit regressions of Hypothesis 3 that use choice data for Pairs 1 and 3
from each payoff mechanism separately are reported in the DCRE column of Table 3 (and
complete results are reported in appendix Table A.2). The estimated Pair 3 effect is
insignificant with data from all mechanisms except PORpi and PAC. Estimation with data
from the PAC mechanism suggests that the likelihood of the less risky option being chosen is
14.5% lower in Pair 3 (p = 0.046), which is consistent with DRRA risk preferences. In
contrast, estimation with data from the PORpi mechanism suggests IRRA risk preferences as
the estimated Pair 3 effect is significant and positive (p = 0.02). Results from the Cochran Q
test reported in the last row of the DCRE part of Table A.2 are generally consistent with the
between-subjects probit analysis.
Results from probit tests of Hypothesis 4 are reported in the DCCE column of Table 3
(and complete results are reported in the DCCE part of appendix Table A.2). Estimated Pair 5
effect (increasing all payoffs by $12) is insignificant (two-sided p-values  0.10) with data
from all mechanisms except OT. Revealed risk preferences with the mechanisms that involve
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many tasks are consistent with CARA but OT data are consistent with preferences that exhibit
IARA as the sign of the Pair 5 estimate is positive (p = 0.031). For many-task treatments, the
within-subjects analysis is consistent with across-subjects analysis as the Cochran Q test
results reported in the last row of Table A.2 are consistent with the probit test results.
Data from the several mechanisms have divergent implications for testing for CARA
and CRRA within the range of payoffs used in the experiment. Data from three mechanisms
reject either CRRA or CARA whereas data from five mechanisms do not reject either. The
four mechanisms that are incentive compatible for dual theory of expected utility are OT,
PAC, PAC/N and PAS. Two out of these four incentive compatible mechanisms produce data
that are inconsistent with dual theory of expected utility because the data are inconsistent with
either CARA or CRRA (the entries in Table 3 are “Yes” in either the DCRE or DCCE
column).
We have used eight mechanisms to generate risk preference data for five lottery pairs
that have the potential to test for distinguishing properties of different theories of risk
preferences. Out of eight mechanisms, only PORnp seems to be producing data that do not
reject any of the four hypotheses. A central implication from the test results in Table 3 is that
there is strong support for the view that test results for classic paradoxes of decision theory are
dependent on the payoff mechanism that is used to elicit the risk preferences.

6 Revealed risk preferences differ across payoff mechanisms
It has been argued in the literature (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979) that subjects evaluate
each choice independently of the other choice opportunities in an experiment. If this “isolation
hypothesis” were to have robust empirical validity then all mechanisms in our experiment
would elicit the same risk preferences. We ask whether the risk preferences revealed by
subjects differ across treatments that use different payoff mechanisms or whether they are
consistent with isolation of individual choices. The five columns of Table 4 summarize, for
each lottery choice pair i (=1,2,…,5) and each elicitation mechanism, the percentage of
subjects who chose the less risky (or “safer”) lottery in that pair, denoted by Si.
Looking down the Si columns of Table 4 we see that in three out of five columns the
largest figure is more than three times the smallest one: for Pair 2, choices of the less risky
option vary over mechanisms from 15.52% (OT) to 52.63% (PAC and PAI); for Pair 4 these
choices vary from 10.00% (PORpas) to 34.21% (PAI); and for Pair 5, choices of the less risky
option vary from 17.95% (PAS) to 60% (PORnp). The Kruskal-Wallis rank test rejects the
null hypothesis that these frequencies come from the same population (chi-squared = 13.58; p
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= 0.059). To test for effects of mechanisms on overall revealed level of risk aversion we
created a new variable, the total number of times an individual chose the less risky option.
This (“Total”) variable takes integer values from 0 to 5. The Kruskal-Wallis rank test strongly
rejects the null hypothesis that observations of the variable Total observed across five-task
mechanisms come from the same distribution (chi-squared = 22.75; p = 0.001). Figures on the
ranks and means (m) of variable Total reveal that PORnp (m=2.23, sd=1.27) and PAI
(m=2.13, sd=1.49) elicit the most risk averse preferences whereas PAS (m=1.10, sd=1.35) and
PORpas (m=1.25, sd=0.93) elicit the least risk averse preferences.
Table 4. Observed Frequencies (in %) of Choices of Less Risky Options
(low and high column figures in bold)
Mechanism

S1

S2

S3

S4

S5

All Pairs
[95% CI]

OT
(231 subjects)

39.47

15.52

27.59

28.95

38.46

28.60
[22.7, 34.4]

PORnp
(40 subjects)

37.50

45.00

47.50

32.50

60.00

44.50
[37.6, 51.4]

PORpi
(40 subjects)

27.50

50.00

42.50

22.50

50.00

38.50
[31.7, 45.3]

22.50

42.50

20.00

10.00

30.00

25.00
[18.9, 31.1]

25.64

23.08

33.33

10.26

17.95

22.10
[16.2, 27.9]

PAC
(38 subjects)

36.84

52.63

23.68

21.05

42.11

35.30
[28.4, 42.1]

PAC/N
(40 subjects)

37.50

35.00

35.00

22.50

45.00

35.00
[28.3, 41.7]

PAI
(38 subjects)

36.84

52.63

36.84

34.21

52.63

42.60
[35.5, 49.7]

PORpas
(40 subjects)
PAS
(39 subjects)

In addition to reporting an overall level of risk aversion induced by each protocol, we
report in Table 4 (the far right column) for each pair, frequencies of less risky option choices
over all subjects, and the 95% confidence intervals. Again, the new aggregation reveals that
PORnp and PAI elicit more risk averse behavior whereas OT, PAS and PORpas elicit less risk
averse behavior. The differences between revealed risk preferences elicited by the eight
payoff mechanisms are inconsistent with the belief that subjects isolate on each decision in
multiple decision experiments. The data provide support for the alternative view that the
payoff mechanism chosen by the experimenter can significantly affect risk preferences
revealed by the subjects. It is particularly important to note that the confidence intervals for
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the less risky option choice frequency with PORnp and PAI are disjoint from the confidence
intervals for OT, PORpas and PAS.
The above tests use aggregated data. To retrieve information from data at the
individual level we ran probit regressions with subject clusters to allow for correlated errors
across choice tasks within an individual and with robust standard errors to accommodate
heteroscedasticity. Table 5 reports probit marginal effects of several regressors we consider
on the likelihood of choosing the less risky lottery in a pair. We will discuss results from use
of data for all rounds in (probit) Model 3. The alternatives, Model 1 and Model 2 differ from
Model 3 by exclusion of some of the right-hand variables. We include these alternative
specifications in the table in order to show that our central conclusions about mechanism
effects are robust to alternative specifications of the estimation model.
The right hand variables in Model 3 include difference between expected values (EV
Difference) and difference between variances (VAR Difference) of the riskier and safer
lotteries within a pair. The estimated marginal effect for EV Difference is not significant. The
estimated marginal effect for VAR Difference is significantly positive (1.2%, p = 0.002)
which is consistent with aversion to risk: the larger the variance of the riskier option relative
to the less risky one the more likely the less risky option is to be chosen. Some other righthand variables are demographic controls for factors commonly associated with betweensubjects differences in risk attitudes. We use dummies for the subjects’ field of study using
three categories: Science and Engineering, Economics and Business, and Other Majors (the
base group). The subject’s Birth Order is significant; subjects who were a younger sibling or
only child were less likely to choose the less risky lottery than an older sibling. Female
subjects were more likely to choose the less risky lottery. Older subjects were less likely to
choose the less risky lottery. Probability of choosing the less risky lottery was not
significantly affected by a subject’s race (Black).
The other variables used in the probit regressions are dummy variables for multiple
decision payoff mechanism treatments. All mechanism treatment dummy variables equal 0 for
OT data. Otherwise, a value equal to 1 for any one of the multiple decision payoff mechanism
dummy variables selects data for that mechanism. The effects of PORnp and PAI mechanisms
on subjects’ choices (in the direction of higher risk aversion) are highly significant at 1%;
other mechanisms with significant coefficients are PORpi (p = 0.040) and PAC (p = 0.080),
and PAC/N (p = 0.051). The signs of the estimated effects of the above multiple decision
mechanisms are all positive, which provides support for the finding that subjects are more
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likely to choose the less risky option (they appear to be more risk averse) with all multiple
decision payoff mechanisms except PORpas and PAS than they are with the OT protocol.
Table 5 Probit Analysis of Choices of Less Risky Options
All Rounds
Regressors

First Round

Last Round

-0.028
(0.426)
0.012***
(0.002)

-0.023
(0.705)
0.007
(0.331)

-0.034
(0.585)
0.007
(0.357)

0.037
(0.267)
0.022
(0.556)
-0.029*
(0.053)
0.094***
(0.002)
0.041
(0.173)
-0.050
(0.106)

0.036
(0.278)
0.023
(0.539)
-0.029*
(0.053)
0.096***
(0.002)
0.042
(0.167)
-0.052*
(0.098)

-0.008
(0.876)
0.053
(0.331)
-0.045**
(0.033)
0.038
(0.403)
0.038
(0.388)
-0.005
(0.915)

0.016
(0.759)
0.002
(0.969)
-0.039*
(0.069)
0.091**
(0.042)
0.059
(0.179)
-0.078*
(0.089)

0.171***
(0.001)
0.109**
(0.039)
-0.036
(0.435)
-0.068
(0.261)
0.076
(0.187)
0.073
(0.183)
0.152***
(0.009)

0.143***
(0.007)
0.104**
(0.046)
-0.060
(0.212)
-0.057
(0.340)
0.096*
(0.095)
0.097*
(0.063)
0.175***
(0.002)

0.149***
(0.005)
0.109**
(0.040)
-0.058
(0.238)
-0.053
(0.387)
0.102*
(0.080)
0.104*
(0.051)
0.183***
(0.002)

0.272***
(0.002)
0.073
(0.389)
0.038
(0.655)
-0.050
(0.556)
0.099
(0.256)
0.174**
(0.041)
0.169*
(0.054)

0.182**
(0.036)
0.199**
(0.019)
-0.071
(0.387)
-0.073
(0.392)
0.171**
(0.048)
0.022
(0.799)
0.212**
(0.017)

1,606
(506)
-994.0

1,606
(506)
-991.6

1,606
(506)
-978.5

506
(506)
-311.8

506
(506)
-304.2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Pair Characteristics
EV Difference
VAR Difference

-0.028
(0.431)
0.012***
(0.002)

Demographics
Science & Engineering
Economics & Business
Birth Order
Female
Black
Older than 21

Treatment Effects
DPORnp
DPORpi
DPORpas
DPAS
DPAC
DPAC/N
DPAI

Nr. Of Observations
(Nr. of Subjects)
Log-likelihood

p-values in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The PORpas and PAS mechanisms produce data that clearly differ from data elicited
by other multiple decision mechanisms. We tested for differences between the estimates for
PAS and those for other mechanisms. Using the Model 3 estimates, we find that the estimated
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effect of PAS is different from the estimated effect of PORnp (p = 0.010) and PAI (p =
0.007), where the figures in parentheses are Bonferroni-adjusted p-values.7

7 Behavioral properties of mechanisms
Inconsistency with the isolation hypothesis makes clear the importance of researching the
behavioral properties of mechanisms. What can account for the discrepancies across
mechanisms in elicited risk preferences? The probit marginal effects reported in section 6
show that subjects were responding to the properties of lotteries within a pair. Our subjects
made choices that reveal risk aversion since increase in the difference between variances of
returns of the riskier and less risky lottery within a pair had a positive effect on the less risky
option being chosen. Other estimates from the demographic variables are consistent with
findings in other studies. The payoff mechanism effects on elicited risk preferences revealed
through treatment estimates (in Table 5) are partly predicted by the incentive incompatibility
examples in section 3 but there is more to the explanation of behavioral properties of
mechanisms.
The probit estimated marginal effects reported in the right-most two columns in Table
5 for data from Round 1 and Round 5 yield further insight into these behavioral properties. It
is important to recall that the choice order of the five lottery pairs is randomly and
independently selected for each subject. Therefore Round 1 and Round 5 choices reported in
Table 5 will each include a random selection of distinct lottery pairs. Hence the dummy
variables for protocols in Round 1 and 5 are picking up choice order effects not lottery pair
effects.
The estimate of the dummy variable coefficient for PAS data shows risk preferences
that are not different from OT in any comparison in Table 5, including all rounds (Model 3)
and Round 1 and Round 5. This is a particularly interesting result because, of all the multidecision payoff mechanisms, PAS is the one that has traditionally been suspected of crosstask contamination (from wealth effects). The way in which PAS might exhibit cross-task
contamination would be if there were a significant wealth effect on risk preferences, in which
case risk preferences elicited in a subsequent round would not be independent of choices and
realized outcomes in earlier rounds. Probit analysis of data from our experiment, that includes
total payoff from lotteries chosen in earlier periods as an explanatory variable for choice
between riskier and less risky options in the current period, finds no significance of the

7

Unadjusted p-values are: 0.002 (PORnp), 0.016 (PORpi), 0.933 (PORpas), 0.001 (PAI), 0.028 (PAC) and 0.018
(PAC/N).
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estimated coefficient for this wealth variable (p = 0.767): see the result reported in the PAS
Wealth column and Accumulated Payoff row of Table 6. This finding is consistent with
earlier detailed analyses that found no significant wealth effects in other experiments that use
PAS (Cox and Epstein, 1989; Cox and Grether, 1996).
In section 3 we provided some examples that illustrate the lack of incentive
compatibility of mechanisms for different theories. Those examples offer insights on crosstask effects that different mechanisms might induce. We shall be testing for cross-task effects
when a subject saw the tasks relevant to the hypothesis one right after the other. The example
in section 3 for the PAS mechanism suggests that the payoff received in the preceding round
may have a negative effect on the likelihood of choosing the less risky option in the current
round. Probit regression reported in Table 6 using PAS data, however, reveal that the payoff
in the immediately preceding round (see the Cross-Task Cont., Preceding Payoff row and
PAS Wealth column) fails to have a significant effect on the likelihood of the less risky option
being chosen in the current round; the estimate is negative but insignificant (two-sided pvalue = 0.125).
Results differ widely for the different implementations of POR. Consider first the
performance of PORpas which shows risk preferences that are not different from OT in any
comparison in Table 5, including all rounds (Model 3) and Round 1 and Round 5. In this
way, PORpas data resemble both OT and PAS data. This contrasts sharply with results for the
PORnp experimental treatment in which subjects in Round 1 have the same lack of previous
experience with lottery pair choices and the same information about lottery pairs as subjects in
the OT treatment. The highly significant, positive estimated marginal effect in the First Round
column and DPORnp row (0.272, p = 0.002) shows that PORnp elicited much more risk
averse preferences in the first round than did the OT mechanism; the likelihood of the less
risky option being chosen is 27.2% higher. The only difference between these two treatments
in Round 1 is that in PORnp subjects had been informed that there would be subsequent
choices and that one choice would be randomly selected for payoff. This information, itself,
led to much more aversion to risk in the preferences elicited in Round 1.
An alternative implementation of random selection, the PORpi mechanism, yielded
quite different results in Round 1. Here, the estimated marginal effect (in Table 5) of PORpi
for Round 1 is insignificant (p = 0.389). Recall that the difference in subjects’ information
across the PORnp and PORpi mechanisms at the time of Round 1 choice consists entirely of
their knowing in PORpi what the subsequent lottery choice pairs will be and their not having
this information in PORnp. Together, the comparisons of PORnp with OT, PORpas and
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PORpi data suggest that the ambiguity of future choice options that subjects faced in PORnp
caused them to behave as if they were more risk averse in Round 1.8
Table 6. Probit Tests of Cross-Task Effects
Mechanism
Regressors

PORnp
CRE
CCE

PORpi
CRE CCE

PORpas
CRE
CCE “Wealth

PAS
Wealth

0.013
(0.882)
0.012
(0.223)

-0.223***
(0.008)
0.027***
(0.002)

-0.004
(0.498)

-0.007
(0.125)

Pair Characteristics
EV differences
VAR differences

Cross-Task Cont.
Preceding Payoff
Preceding Choice

0.266
(0.148)

-0.438**
(0.022)

-0.068 -0.325*
(0.714) (0.061)

-0.081
(0.442)

-0.026
(0.550)

Wealth/ Portfolio
Accumul. Payoff

0.000
(0.990)

Nr. Of Observations
Log-Likelihood

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

32

30

32

32

-18.76

-14.01

-20.23

-15.90

0.001
(0.767)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

24

200

195

-10.20

-7.03

-106.9

-88.39

28

0.186
(0.127)
-0.004
(0.799)

-0.180
(0.129)

Accumul. S Choices
Demographics

PAI
Portfolio

0.133**
(0.018)
Yes
152
-86.86

Robust p-values in parentheses: *** denotes p<0.01; ** denotes p<0.05; * denotes p<0.1.

The Round 5 results in Table 5 look very different. Here, the estimated marginal
effects for PORnp and PORpi are almost identical but they are significantly different from
zero and from the estimate for PORpas.9 In Round 5 subjects in all POR treatments knew that
this would be their last decision. However, with PORnp and PORpi they were evaluating the
task 5 options within an environment containing a compound lottery reflecting prior-round
option choices whereas with PORpas the environment included a simple lottery over realized
payoffs from prior choices. With PORnp and PORni subjects were significantly more risk
averse in Round 5 than in OT, PAS and PORpas.
Payoff mechanism effects with PORnp and PORpi are reported in other recent papers.
Harrison and Swarthout (2013) study payoff protocol effects on estimated risk attitudes. They
find that RDU estimates with OT (or “1-in-1”) data and PORnp (or “1-in-30”) data are
significantly different whereas the EU estimates are not affected. Cox, et al. (2014) report that
8

See also the discussion in section 10 of biases introduced by use of PORnp in social preferences experiments.
Chi2(1)=5.36 and p= 0.021 for estimated effects of PORnp and PORpas being the same and chi2(1)=5.86 and
p= 0.016 for PORpi and PORpas case.
9
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the choices elicited by PORpi can be systematically manipulated by inclusion of
asymmetrically dominated choice alternatives, which implies that PORpi does not generally
elicit true risk preferences.
PORnp and PORpi are immune to preceding-payoff cross-task effects because no
lottery payoff is realized before a subsequent choice is made. In order to test for cross-task
effects with PORnp and PORpi, we test for choice order effects on revelation of classical
paradoxes. In this case, as with PAS, we look at adjacent choices but now we focus on the
case in which the pairs involved in a classical paradox were faced by a subject one right after
the other. If there is any cross-task effect of this type one would expect it to be weaker in
PORpi than in PORnp because subjects have already seen all five pairs in advance with the
former implementation of the mechanism. The data support this conjecture. As shown in
Table 3, PORnp does not reveal CRE or CCE when all data are used. In contrast, as shown in
Table 6 (Cross-Task Cont., Preceding Choice row), if we focus only on adjacent choices then
PORnp adjacent data reveal a CCE (p-value = 0.022) but not a CRE (p-value = 0.148). Hence,
PORnp data are characterized by choice order effects as CCE is present in the adjacent
choices but absent otherwise. PORpi adjacent choices data show a weakly significant (p-value
= 0.061) Preceding Choice effect for CCE that is consistent with the all-data result in Table 3
(and the Pair 4(D) effect reported in the PORpi column of Table A.1). With adjacent choice
data for PORpas, we do not find significant cross-task contamination from resolved payoffs
(see the “Preceding Payoff” and “Accumulated Payoff” rows) nor any EU paradoxes (see the
Preceding Choice row). Since CRE is present in the Table 3 test with all data, however, this
inconsistent adjacent-round test result may suggest some possible cross-task contamination.
Comparison of the estimated effects of PAC and PAC/N in Table 5 also yields
behavioral insight into these mechanism effects. Recall that the only difference between these
two mechanisms is the scale of payoffs; experimental treatments with these two mechanisms
are otherwise identical. Subjects in the PAC and PAC/N treatments have the same information
about lotteries in Round 1 and Round 5 as do subjects in the PORpi treatment. Expected
payoffs for PAC are N times as large as for PORpi; they are the same for PAC/N and PORpi.
Choice behavior in PAC follows a similar pattern as in PORpi, with no significant difference
from OT in Round 1 but significantly more risk averse behavior by Round 5. PAC/N follows
the reverse pattern, with significantly more revealed risk aversion than OT in Round 1 but no
difference from OT in Round 5.
The section 3 example of possible portfolio effects from the PAI mechanism shows
how, with uncorrelated lotteries, a portfolio with several riskier options may be preferred to
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other portfolios even when the agent prefers the less risky lottery to the riskier lottery in
isolation. If so, then we might observe that a current choice of the less risky option has a
positive effect on the likelihood of the less risky option being chosen later. 10 Data are
consistent with this conjecture. Probit regression reported in Table 6 (PAI Portfolio column,
Accumulated S choices row) shows a significant positive effect (p = 0.018) of the previous
total number of choices of the less risky option on the likelihood of choosing the less risky
option in the current decision task.

8 Comparisons to previous literature
Several previous studies tested whether POR elicits true preferences and concluded that
serious distortions were not observed. But many of these conclusions are based on
experimental protocols or tests of hypotheses that do not actually support the conclusion of
robust absence of preference distortion by POR.
Camerer (1989) allows subjects to change their choices after the task relevant for
payoff has been randomly selected. Since few people do so, he concludes that POR does not
induce biases. This conclusion, however, implicitly relies on the assumption that decision
makers are “naïve” rather than “resolute” (Machina 1989). If decision makers are resolute
then the other options involved in the POR mechanism could lead to altered preferences and
these altered preferences would still hold after selection of the task relevant for payoff, which
would cause subjects to stick with initially-biased preference revelation.
Starmer and Sugden (1991) and Hey and Lee (2005a)11 test isolation against the
alternative hypothesis that subjects make all choices so as to yield the most preferred
probability distribution of payoffs from the whole experiment (called “full reduction”). Their
tests reject full reduction in favor of the alternative of isolation. But there are many
alternatives to isolation other than full reduction, which is a priori implausible in experiments
in which subjects make a large number of choices and first see a lottery pair when they are
asked to make the choice for that pair (as noted by Hey and Lee 2005a).
Hey and Lee (2005b) report tests that use two “partial reduction” hypotheses that
differ according to whether the current choice task is given the same weight or higher weight
10

This hypothesis is also consistent with a subject who always goes for the safe choice. But if the positive sign
of the estimate of the accumulated number of less risky choices is picking up this effect then we should see a
significant positive estimate in PORpi and PORnp data as well. This is not what we find; the p-values of the
estimate are 0.236 and 0.240 for PORnp and PORpi.
11
In the experiment reported in Hey and Lee (2005a, 2005b), one out of 179 subjects was selected to receive
payment for one out of his or her 30 choices.
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than all preceding choice tasks when subjects make choices to the yield the most preferred
probability distribution of payoffs. They report that isolation appears to explain the data better
than either form of partial reduction.
Both full and partial reduction are extreme alternatives to the isolation hypothesis.
More plausible alternatives are provided by hypotheses about cross-task contamination, as
supported by our data. This leads us to ask whether cross-task contamination was observed in
previous experiments with POR.
8.1 Cross-task contamination from POR in previous experiments
Starmer and Sugden (1991, pg. 977) reported their two-tailed test for cross-task contamination
with PORpi data was marginally significant (with p-value 0.051).12 They used PORpi and an
“impure” form of OT in which subjects made one incentivized choice following many
hypothetical choices. Beattie and Loomes (1997) used “pure” OT in which the one
incentivized task is not embedded in other decision tasks. They found a significant difference
between responses to PORpi and OT in one of four analyzed choice problems.
8.2 Experiment with impure OT
We conducted a new Impure OT treatment using a payoff protocol similar to the one in
Starmer and Sugden (1991) and Cubitt et al. (1998).13 Seventy-seven subjects participated in
this experiment. Subjects were given envelopes with the five lottery pairs in Table 1 in
random order, as in all of our other treatments except PORnp. The first four decision tasks
have hypothetical payoffs. The fifth task is paid for sure. We analyze data from the fifth task.
In that task, 26 subjects were given option Pair 2, 26 subjects were given Pair 3, and 25
subjects were given Pair 4. Each subject was given four other option pairs in independent
random order.14
Based on our previous findings, we hypothesized that embedding the one paid round
of Impure OT in a multiple decision treatment with four hypothetical payoff decisions would
have an effect on elicited risk preferences similar to that in PORpi and PORnp: that it would
increase the proportion of less risky option choices. This is what we find: the percentage of
less risky choices for the three pairs (2, 3, and 4) is 23.4% with OT and 35% with Impure OT.
12

This result seems to be consistent with our finding of cross-task contamination by POR unless one insists: (a)
on a specific two-tailed test; and (b) that a p-value of 5.1% rather than 5.0% leads to opposite conclusions.
Starmer and Sugden (1991, pg. 977) state (in our view correctly) that “… we cannot claim to have proved, on the
basis of such a test, that the random-lottery incentive system is unbiased.”
13
This experiment was suggested by a referee.
14
We select only CRE and CCE lottery pairs for payoff to stay close to the Starmer and Sugden (1991) design.
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To compare the elicited risk preferences of Impure OT with those in other treatments, we use
probit regressions of the type reported in Table 5 using only data for the incentivized tasks 2,
3, and 4. These probit estimates, reported in appendix Table A.3, reveal that preferences
elicited by Impure OT are significantly more risk averse than those for OT.
We also looked at whether CRE or CCE is observed with Impure OT data.
We find that in the paid round, the less risky option was chosen by 30.77% (pair 2), 42.31%
(pair 3) and 32% (pair 4) of subjects. Data show neither CRE nor CCE: Fisher’s exact test
reports a p-value of 0.565 for both. Similar to the across-subjects data analysis for OT, we ran
probit regressions using Pair 2, 3, and 4 data and a dummy variable for Pair 3 data (see Table
A.3, CRE and CCE columns). The Pair 3 estimated effect is not significant; the two-sided pvalues are 0.195 (CRE) and 0.268 (CCE). We conclude that neither CRE nor CCE is observed
with our Impure OT data.

9 Implications for choice of mechanism in decision theory experiments
There are two distinct questions that arise in evaluating mechanisms: (a) incentive
compatibility and (b) cross-task contamination. Incentive compatibility is a straightforward
theoretical question. Mechanism cross-task contamination is an empirical question. This leads
us to the topic of spelling out implications of our theoretical and empirical analysis for
experimental methods. We consider three ways of looking at this issue that differ in terms of
the objectives of particular applications of experimental methods.

9.1 All or nothing approach to testing a theory
One coherent approach to testing hypotheses that follow from a particular theoretical model is
to use a payoff mechanism that is incentive compatible for that theory, test the hypotheses,
and state conclusions about the theory. Application of this approach to testing various models
is informed by the content of section 3.
One puzzle in the literature is provided by the widespread use of POR rather than PAS
to test hypotheses for cumulative prospect theory (CPT); see, for examples, papers by
Birnbaum (2004, 2008), Kothiyal et al. (2013), Harrison and Rutström (2009), and Wakker et
al. (2007). It was generally known after results in Holt (1986) that POR places crucial
reliance on the independence axiom that was subsequently explicitly discarded under CPT
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992), which makes POR inappropriate for tests of CPT with
internal theoretical validity. Furthermore, CPT was also specifically developed as a model
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defined on income, not terminal wealth, hence wealth effects are not relevant. This means that
PAS is a mechanism that should have been used in tests of CPT that would have had internal
theoretical validity.15 Kachelmeir and Shehata (1992) did use PAS to pay their subjects in
tests of CPT, however their data are confounded by use of the Becker et al. (1964) mechanism
to elicit certainty equivalents, which also requires the independence axiom for its incentive
compatibility (Karni and Safra 1987).
9.2 Nuanced approach to testing a theory
There are issues distinct from incentive compatibility that arise in a nuanced approach to
testing theory in which the researcher is concerned about the source of consistency or
inconsistency with hypotheses. A good example is provided by the tests for CCE reported in
sections 5 and 8. PORpi is incentive compatible for expected utility theory (EU), hence the
significant inconsistency with CCE with data from that mechanism has internal theoretical
validity. But PORnp, PORpas, OT, and Impure OT are also incentive compatible for EU and
data from our treatments with those mechanisms do not exhibit CCE. The difference in test
results comes from the different behavioral properties of the payoff mechanisms, all of which
are theoretically incentive compatible for EU. A nuanced approach to testing a theoretical
hypothesis will try to discriminate between inconsistencies with theory that are specific to one
incentive compatible payoff mechanism and patterns of inconsistency that are robust to other
incentive compatible mechanisms. The clear implication for experimental methods is to avoid
drawing conclusions about fundamental properties such as CCE by running an experiment
using only one of the incentive compatible mechanisms.
9.3 Discriminating between theories
Research on decisions under risk includes experiments designed to discriminate between
alternative theories; see, for examples, Camerer (1989) and Hey and Orme (1994). Design of
experiments of this type encounters an especially difficult issue of incentive compatibility
because a payoff mechanism that is incentive compatible for one of the theoretical models
being compared is typically not incentive compatible for one or more of the other theoretical
models if subjects make multiple decisions. This problem is present in the experiments
reported by Camerer (1989) and Hey and Orme (1994) that asked subjects to make multiple
15

The literature on CPT experiments also includes many papers in which subjects were not paid salient rewards
for any decision (e.g, Abdellaoui et al. 2007, Birnbaum and Chavez 1997, Bleichrodt, et al. 2001, Lopes and
Oden 1999, and Gonzalez and Wu 1999). Previous research shows that hypothetical payoffs can lead to opposite
conclusions than monetary payoffs in some experiments on decisions under risk (e.g., Cox and Grether, 1996).
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decisions and paid them using some version of POR. Such experiments could be conducted
using OT, as that mechanism is incentive compatible for all theories. Experiments comparing
cumulative prospect theory with the expected utility of income model would have theoretical
validity if they used PAS because both models are defined on income, not terminal wealth.
Experiments comparing linear cumulative prospect theory with dual theory of expected utility
using cosigned lotteries would have theoretical validity if they used PAC, PAC/N or PAS.
It is possible to discriminate between alternative theories using data from mechanisms
other than OT. The problem with many studies that test non-EUT theories with POR data is
that they interpret the observed choices of, say, A1 and B2 and A3 as revealing that the subject
ranks option A1 weakly higher than the alternative option B1, and B2 weakly higher than A2,
and A3 weakly higher than B3; this is of course not correct unless the maintained theory is EU
(see section 3). But data do reveal subjects’ preferences over options conditional on the
incentives provided by the payoff mechanism. Consider, for example, PORpi and three
decision tasks of choosing between options Ai and Bi for i =1,2,3. Regardless of which theory
the researcher is applying, observations such as choice of A1 (rather than B1) and B2 (rather
than A2) and A3 (rather than B3) with PORpi payoffs reveal that the subject ranks lottery R =
(A1,1/3;B2,1/3;A3,1/3) weakly higher than any other feasible lottery, including lotteries P =
(B1,1/3;B2,1/3;A3,1/3) and Q = (A1,1/3;B2,1/3;B3,1/3). However, the observed choices do not
tell us how the subject ranks lotteries P and Q, nor how she ranks Ai and Bi in the absence of
assumption of the independence axiom. Hence, it is logically coherent to conclude from the
observed choices that a maintained theory’s functional evaluated for lottery R has higher
value than that theory’s functional evaluated for P (or Q, or another feasible compound
lottery). One can use this information to make inferences about risk preferences of the subject,
given the theory, by using the composition of the theory’s functional and the functional form
of the payoff mechanism.
10 More implications for experimental methods
Issues raised in studying the theoretical and behavioral properties of payoff mechanisms have
broad implications for experimental methods. We here consider a few illustrative examples.
10.1 Examples of experiments on ambiguity
Empirical failure of isolation is clearly a problem for the growing literature on experiments
with theories of decision under uncertainty and ambiguity that do not include the
independence axiom. These experiments typically involve many decisions and use PORnp as
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the payoff mechanism (e.g., Abdellaoui et al. 2011, Charness et al. 2013). This means that the
data may reflect confounds and biases from two sources: incentive incompatibility and
behavioral cross-task contamination. Payoff mechanism incentive incompatibility is a central
logical question that has simply been ignored in this literature. In addition, there are issues of
possible cross-task contamination that arise in ambiguity experiments that are similar to those
found in data from our risk experiments. Experiments on ambiguity could use OT to avoid
confounds in the data from payoff mechanism effects. Or they could analyze data with an
approach analogous to the one described for risk theories in the last paragraph of section 9.
10.2 Examples of experiments on social preferences
Many experiments on social preferences involve decisions under risk or uncertainty. For
example if a first mover in an investment game experiment (Berg et al. 1995) sends money to
the second mover, the first mover’s monetary payoff in the experiment is risky (or uncertain)
because it depends on the subsequent return decision of the second mover. Many social
preferences experiments involve between-subjects designs with one shot games (e.g., Berg, et
al. 1995), hence are using OT. But many other experiments include multiple decisions under
risk (or uncertainty) and use some mechanism for paying the subjects. The most commonly
used mechanism for multiple-decision social preferences experiments is PAS (e.g. Bohnet et
al. 2008, Charness and Haruvy 2002, Fehr and Gachter 2000, 2002, and Fehr and Schmidt
2004), which has internal theoretical validity for income models of decision under risk.
Some papers, however, report experiments with role reversal (hence two decisions)
and use PAI (e.g., Burks et al. 2003, Chaudhuri and Gangadharan 2007), which has internal
theoretical validity only for expected value theory; for risk averse subjects, these experiments
involve portfolio incentives that confound drawing conclusions from the data. We believe use
of PAI should be avoided unless the researcher is willing to model its portfolio incentives in
econometric analysis of the data. PORpas or PORpi would be better choices if the maintained
theory is consistent with reduction and independence. PAS would be a good choice if the
maintained theory is defined on income or the researcher checks for possible wealth effects on
second round choices.
Other researchers (e.g, Charness and Rabin 2002) use hybrids of the PAI and PORnp
mechanisms in which some number of decisions larger than one are randomly selected for
payoffs that are determined by PAI. Such hybrid mechanisms may contain both the portfolio
incentives of PAI and the behavioral cross-task contamination of PORnp, and should be
avoided. Use of PAS should be seriously considered as a better mechanism for such
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experiments. If a researcher is concerned about possible wealth effects from PAS (even if they
are undocumented), or its cost, then serious consideration should be given to use of PORpas
(unless the maintained theory is inconsistent with the independence axiom).
Experiments intended to “identify” trust and reciprocity or “decompose” trust and
trustworthiness inherently involve decisions in more than one game or decision task. Trust can
be identified in a between-subjects design with OT using the investment and triple dictator
games (Cox 2004). Within-subjects designs with PAI for multiple tasks, such as a risk game
and investment game and triple dictator game (Etang et al. 2011), cannot identify trust
because responses are confounded by portfolio incentives. Use of PAI in such experiments
should be avoided in favor of between-subjects designs and OT.
Ashraf et al. (2006) use a within-subjects design, with two tasks including a trust game
and risk game, and use PORnp (where a subject makes one decision in each treatment). The
within-subjects design with PORnp has internal theoretical validity for expected utility theory
but there can be cross-task contamination that biases data with this type of protocol, as has
been reported in papers that tested for it. For example, Cox (2009) reports an experiment in
which data show that informing subjects there will be another unspecified decision task
following a dictator game significantly shifts their behavior towards greater generosity even in
an experiment in which there is anonymity (because of double-blind payoffs) and random
selection of one task for payoff. With this implementation of the PORnp mechanism, subjects
do not isolate their play in a dictator game from the other decision task in the experiment.
Cox et al (2008) report three experiments with different designs for the moonlighting game
and dictator control games. Experiment 2 has a within-subjects design for the moonlighting
game and dictator control games and uses the PORnp mechanism to pay subjects. Experiment
3 has a between-subjects design for the moonlighting game and dictator control game and
pays subjects with OT. Data show that subjects are more trusting and fearful in Experiment 2
than in Experiment 3. With this implementation of the PORnp mechanism, subjects do not
isolate their play in the moonlighting game from their play in the dictator game. Both of these
papers (Cox 2009 and Cox et al. 2008) test for and find cross-task contamination (between
treatments) from the PORnp mechanism in the context of social preferences experiments. A
clear implication is that a researcher running this type of multiple-treatment experiment
should use a between-subjects design and OT, not a within-subjects design and PORnp.
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10.3 Examples of experiments on public goods and voting
Experiments on voluntary provision of public goods (VCM) or on voting often include
multiple rounds and use PAS (e.g., Isaac and Walker 1988; Montero et al. 2008). As is
recognized in the literature, such designs can involve repeated game incentives. Use of PAS is
a good choice if the data analysis assumes that subjects are playing a repeated game or if
repeated game effects inherent in multiple rounds is effectively controlled.
Goeree et al. (2002) report an experiment in which subjects make 10 VCM decisions
(involving different internal and external marginal return rates) without feedback. PORnp was
used for payoff from the VCM rounds. Subjects were told in advance that the VCM treatment
(“experiment”) would be followed by another treatment (“experiment”) that would pay money
but were not given any information about the nature of the second treatment. They were told
that their earnings from the VCM treatment would be computed during the second treatment
and payoffs from both treatments would be paid at the end. Bosman et al. (2013) report an
experiment on voting in which subjects play the stage game with observed actions 50 times.
Subjects were told that 10 rounds would be randomly selected at the end of experiment and
payoffs from those 10 decisions would all be paid. The former protocol embeds PORnp (for
VCM) within PAI (for the two treatments), whereas the latter embeds PORpi (for the stage
game) within PAI (10 rounds not 1 round for random selection). Hence they can introduce
confounds from interaction of the cross-task contamination problems of POR and PAI
mechanisms. Embedding POR within PAI should be avoided. The use of OT would avoid
confounds. If subject task experience is believed to be important and the interest is on the
stage game behavior then Impure OT is a possibility. Alternatively, PAS could be used with
only the known last period used in data analysis or the behavior of subjects in a repeated game
analyzed using data from all rounds and properly accounting for interim payoffs.

10.4 Examples of experiments on bargaining
Bolton (1991) reports an experiment with ten-round alternating offer bargaining games in
which outcomes are announced each round but two rounds are randomly selected for payoff at
the end of the experiment. Random selection of two rounds creates an incentive for portfolio
decisions across rounds. A better procedure would be to use PAS, because it is incentive
compatible for income models, and modeling wealth effects (required in repeated games
analysis) is less challenging than modeling cross-task contamination and portfolio effects.
Rapoport et al. (1996) experiment with ultimatum games in which the size of the pie is
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known to the proposer but a random variable with a uniform distribution for the responder.
Subjects make multiple decisions as both proposers and responders. An individual subject’s
payoff was determined in the following way. At the end of the experiment, three trials were
chosen randomly including two where the subject was assigned the role of sender and one
where she played the role of receiver. The subject was paid the outcome on these three trials.
This payoff protocol embeds PORnp within PAI, which can produce data confounded by the
interaction of cross-task contamination by both mechanisms. If subject task experience and
role reversal are believed to be important then Impure OT could be considered for use instead
of the composition of PORnp and PAI.
Recent data show effects from selection of payoff mechanism in bargaining
experiments even when both mechanisms are incentive compatible. Sadiraj and Sun (2012)
conduct an experiment on bargaining with alternating offers on gain and loss domains using
POR and Impure OT payoff protocols. They report that Impure OT induces more efficient
bargaining behavior than POR and that the effect is more pronounced when subjects bargain
over the distribution of gains than the shares of losses.
11 Summary
If it were true that subjects isolate each individual decision in multiple decision experiments
then choice of payoff mechanism would be an unimportant detail. But it is not generally true;
therefore choice of payoff mechanism has central importance for the validity of conclusions
that can be drawn from data. We have evaluated mechanisms on the basis of two criteria: (a)
incentive compatibility and (b) cross-task contamination.
Use of a mechanism that is not incentive compatible with a model to experimentally
generate data to test that model is not logically coherent. Indeed, researchers using this
approach have been dubbed “bipolar behaviorists” by Harrison and Swarthout (2013).
Sections 3 and 9 present what we believe to be the current state of knowledge about incentive
compatibility of mechanisms for prominent theories of decision under risk. Section 10
presents a few examples that illustrate how these results have implications for a much broader
range of experimental research than experiments on decision theory. The paper contains many
explicit and implicit critiques of experimental methods. It also contains many positive
recommendations about choice of mechanism for a variety of specific contexts. But there is
no known “ideal mechanism” that will solve all the problems we describe.
Use of a mechanism that is incentive compatible but has bad behavioral properties,
such as demonstrable cross-task contamination, may be logically coherent but would not
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appear to represent sound empirical methods. In this respect, the widespread use of the
PORnp mechanism is particularly hard to defend. It has demonstrable cross-task
contamination (see section 7) and has frequently been used in contexts in which it is known
not to be incentive compatible (see sections 9 and 10).
Many studies could solve the incentive compatibility problem by use of the OT
mechanism but this would entail high cost of subject payoffs that in some designs would be
prohibitive. One approach that we describe in section 9.3 needs more formal theoretical
development and econometric application. We describe it briefly here again. Even in the
absence of the independence axiom, one can use the composition of a theory’s utility
functional and the functional form of a pay one randomly mechanism (such as PORpi or
PORpas) to test propositions following from theory. The problem at the heart of numerous
misapplications of such mechanisms is a strategy for data analysis based on the assumption
that choice of, say, Ak rather than Bk, in the context of multiple other choices, reveals a
truthful pairwise preference for Ak even though the theory being tested implies that
preferences may not be truthfully revealed with the chosen mechanism.
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Appendix Tables
Table A.1. Tests of EU Paradoxes

Mechanisms
CRE
Across subjects
Estimated Marginal
Effect of Pair 3 (D)

Demographics
Nr of subjects
Within subjects
(%) “Violations“
Obs. {SR, RS}

OT

PORnp

PORpi

PORpas

PAS

PAC

PAC/N

0.120
(0.127)

0.022
(0.858)

-0.082
(0.429)

-0.239**
(0.025)

0.102
(0.314)

-0.314***
(0.006)

0.004
(0.972)

-0.195*
(0.071)

Yes
116

Yes
40

Yes
40

Yes
40

Yes
39

Yes
38

Yes
40

Yes
38

52.50
{10, 11}

37.50
{9, 6}

42.50
{13, 4}

35.90
{5, 9}

44.74
{14, 3}

50.00
{10, 10}

31.58
{9, 3}

0.048
(0.827)
{1.000}

0.600
(0.439)
{0.607}

4.76**
(0.029)
{0.049}

1.14
(0.285)
{0.424}

7.12***
(0.008)
{0.013}

0.00
(1.000)
{1.000}

3.00*
(0.083)
{0.146}

0.016
(0.865)

-0.156
(0.237)

-0.207*
(0.058)

-0.101
(0.189)

-0.231***
(0.002)

-0.023
(0.811)

-0.143*
(0.076)

-0.024
(0.834)

Yes
96

Yes
40

Yes
40

Yes
40

Yes
39

Yes
38

Yes
40

Yes
38

60.00
{15, 9}

45.00
{13, 5}

25.00
{7, 3}

28.21
{10, 1}

34.21
{7, 6}

22.50
{7, 2}

39.47
{8, 7}

1.50
(0.221)
{0.308}

3.56*
(0.059)
{0.096}

1.6
(0.206)
{0.344}

7.36***
(0.007)
{0.012}

0.08
(0.782)
{1.000}

2.78
(0.096)
{0.180}

0.067
(0.796)
{1.000}

Cochran’s chi2 (1)
(Pr. > chi2)
{Exact p}
CCE
Across subjects
Estimated Marginal
Effect of Pair 4 (D)

Demographics
Nr of subjects
Within subjects
(%) “Violations“
Obs. {SR, RS}
Cochran’s chi2 (1)
(Pr. > chi2)
{Exact p}

p-values in parentheses: *** if p<0.01; ** if p<0.05; * if p<0.1

PAI
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Table A.2. Tests of Dual EU Paradoxes

Mechanisms
DCRE
Across subjects
Estimated Marginal
Effect of Pair 3 (D)

Demographics
Nr of subjects
Within subjects
(%) “Violations“
Obs. {SR, RS}

OT

PORnp

PORpi

PORpas

PAS

PAC

PAC/N

-0.125
(0.212)

0.134
(0.210)

0.180**
(0.038)

-0.026
(0.733)

0.086
(0.350)

-0.145**
(0.046)

-0.030
(0.731)

-0.009
(0.928)

Yes
96

Yes
40

Yes
40

Yes
40

Yes
39

Yes
38

Yes
40

Yes
38

22.50
{5,4}

30.00

25.00

{4, 8}

{2, 8}

1.33

3.6*

(0.248)

(0.058)

{0.388}

{0.109}

0.201**
(0.031)

0.159
(0.104)

0.002
(0.980)

Yes
97

Yes
40

Cochran’s chi2 (1)
(Pr. > chi2)
{Exact p}
DCCE
Across subjects
Estimated Marginal
Effect of Pair 4 (D)

Demographics
Nr of subjects
Within subjects
(%) “Violations“
Obs. {SR, RS}
Cochran’s chi2 (1)
(Pr. > chi2)
{Exact p}

PAI

28.21

18.42

22.50

26.32

{4, 7}

{6, 1}

{5, 4}

{5, 5}

0.818

3.57*

0.11

0.00

(0.366)

(0.059)

(0.738)

(1.000)

{0.549}

{0.125}

{1.000}

{1.000}

-0.130
(0.187)

-0.044
(0.514)

-0.116
(0.268)

0.113
(0.271)

-0.001
(0.993)

Yes
40

Yes
40

Yes
39

Yes
38

Yes
40

Yes
33

35.00

25.00

15.38

36.84

35.00

26.32

[4, 10}

{5, 5}

37.50
{10, 5}

{4, 2}

{9, 5}

{5, 9}

{5, 5}

2.57

0.00

0.67

1.14

1.14

0.00

(0.101)

(1.000)

(0.414)

(0.285)

(0.285)

(1.000)

{0.180}

{1.000}

{0.688}

{0.424}

{0.424}

{1.000}

0.111
(0.739)
{1.000}

1.67
(0.197)
{0.302}

p-values in parentheses: *** if p<0.01; ** if p<0.05; * if p<0.1
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Table A.3. Probit Regressions for Tasks 2, 3 and 4
All Mechanisms
(1)

(2)

EU Paradoxes
(Impure OT Paid Data)
(3)

CRE

CCE

Regressors
Pair 3 (D)

0.182
(0.205)

0.160
(0.264)

Yes

Yes

Pair Characteristics
EV
Difference
VAR
Difference

-0.033
(0.328)
0.013***
(0.001)

-0.036
(0.304)
0.013***
(0.001)

Demographics
Science &
Engineering
Economics &
Business
Birth Order
Female
Black
Older than 21

0.054
(0.134)

0.052
(0.158)

0.024
(0.569)
-0.042***
(0.008)
0.099***
(0.003)
0.031
(0.337)
-0.034
(0.290)

0.026
(0.536)
-0.043***
(0.007)
0.102***
(0.003)
0.036
(0.279)
-0.036
(0.274)

0.183***
(0.002)
0.171***
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.976)
0.006
(0.930)
0.125**
(0.047)
0.118*
(0.072)
0.222***
(0.001)
0.138*
(0.050)

0.194***
(0.001)
0.181***
(0.006)
0.002
(0.973)
0.013
(0.856)
0.135**
(0.036)
0.129*
(0.054)
0.235***
(0.001)
0.148**
(0.039)

Treatment Effects
PORnp
PORpi
PORpas
PAS
PAC
PAC/N
PAI
OTimpure

0.207***
(0.001)
0.171***
(0.008)
0.014
(0.813)
-0.007
(0.915)
0.109*
(0.089)
0.092
(0.170)
0.203***
(0.004)
0.138**
(0.050)

52
Observations
1,056
1,056
1,056
52
Nr. of Subjects
506
506
506
-29.31
Log-likelihood
-636.9
-634.3
-623.9
p-values in parentheses: *** denotes p<0.01; ** denotes p<0.05; * denotes p<0.1

51
51
-31.30

